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APPENDICES TO PP 396: OLDER WORKERS IN THE MARKET FOR PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT

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This report contains,

APPENDICES TO PP 396: OLDER WORKERS IN THE MARKET FOR PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT.

Contexts includes:

James M. Jondrow Frank Brechling Alan Marcus A general equilibrium theory of hours and compensation per hour; Cridence of the part-time penalty; An empirical inquiry into the relationship between hours worked and compensation; Policy analysis; and The age compensation of different intendenties.





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Appendix A

A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY OF HOURS AND COMPENSATION PER HOUR

The determination of hours of work is presented usually as the outcome of suppliers' or demanders' decisions but only rarely as the outcome of demand and supply interaction in the labor market. Thus, suppliers of labor are assumed to choose optimum levels of hours by maximizing their utility subject to exogenously given fringe benefits and (post-tax) wage rates. Further, demanders of labor typically choose their optimum hours by maximizing profits (or minimizing costs) subject to exogenously given fixed labor costs, hourly wage rates and overtime premiums.

A good example of analysis on the demand side is Ehrenberg's 1971 book on overtime behavior. Here the employer's demand for overtime is related to factors such as the ratio of fixed to variable costs. Empirically, fixed costs are taken as nonwage compensation such as pension contributions along with social insurance contributions.

The Ehrenberg analysis is explicitly based on a short-term, disequilibrium framework, in which workers will supply as much overtime as demanded at a given wage. The assumption is that either there is a chronic excess supply of overtime (the overtime premium is, by law, set too high), or there is a short-term agreement existing between employer and employee that fixes the wage and lets the employer decide hours.

One obvious way to analyze part-time work is to reverse the Ehrenberg analysis to explain "undertime." We did not do this. The reason is that the disequilibrium framework appropriate for a temporary phenomenon such as overtime behavior is not at all appropriate for

permanent, part-time work. Instead, we adopt an approach based on the interaction of market forces: Entry (and exit) ensure that supernormal profits are eliminated so that the typical firm's net output is entirely exhausted by factor payments.

The theory draws heavily on the theory of hedonic prices and implicit markets, as described by Sherwin Rosen. Under this theory, products of different characteristics will sell at different prices, the price differences measure the implicit prices of the different characteristics. The implicit price of a characteristic is determined by the interaction of supply and demand, so it represents both the marginal value and the marginal cost of the characteristic. In the present case, the characteristic is hours per worker. Workers with different hours per week have different characteristics. Hence, they will not be paid at the same hourly rate. In the following, we describe how this hourly pay and equilibrium hours are determined in a general equilibrium context.

Our particular application of Sherwin Rosen's hedonic framework draws on a number of earlier works. H. Gregg Lewis analyzed the employer's demand for longer hours—to economize on fixed cost. Y. Barzel provides a graphical analysis in which there is an equilibrium spectrum of hours and rates of pay. Finally, H. Rosen presents an empirical model in which an hours rate of pay locus forms the budget constraint for labor supply.

The Theory

Let the production function of a typical firm be $C = M \cdot g(h)$ where C stands for net output, measured in units of consumer goods, C for the number of employees and C for the average hours worked. For the sake of simplicity, other factors of production have been ignored. The production function has constant returns in C so that it can be written as C = g(h) where C stands for output per employee. The C function is assumed to have a positive first derivative throughout its relevant range. The second derivative is likely to be positive at low levels and negative at high levels of C. The C function shown in figure C has these properties.

The typical worker's utility function can be written as u(c, h) where the marginal utility of c is positive and falling with c, while the marginal utility of h is negative and falling with h. Such a utility function implies upward sloping convex indifference curves, as illustrated in figure A-1 by the line labeled I.

It should be pointed out that c measures the compensation per employee when h hours are being worked. The average hourly compensation is c/h, which in general is not equal to the slope of the production function at h, namely, g'(h). Typically, c is paid to the worker as a combination of fringe benefits and hourly wages. Note that we are assuming that fringes and wages are of equal value to the employee.

Since competition and free entry ensure that the entire net output

(c) is paid to labor, the g(h) function is the available choice set for

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the typical worker. His or her utility is maximized where an indifference curve is tangential to the g(h) curve. In figure A-1, h* represents a point of maximum utility.

Formally the utility maximization problem can be stated as: Maximize u(c, h) subject to c = g(h). The first-order condition for this problem is

$$\frac{dc}{dh}\Big|_{u=u} = -g'(h^*).$$

Let us now extend the above theoretical framework by allowing for heterogeneous tastes and technologies and for fixed costs.

- 1. Heterogeneous tastes. It is relatively easy to let workers with different tastes coexist in the above model. In figure A-2, let I_1 and I_2 refer to two workers with a relatively strong preference for income and leisure, respectively. The slope of the ray through the origin indicates that the average hourly compensation is lower for the part-time than the full-time worker. (Note again that the ray need not be tangent to the production function. The slope of the ray is the employee's average, not his marginal compensation per hour.)
- 2. Nonremunerative (NR) costs.* Some costs are incurred by employers or employees, but are not received by the other partner to the bargain. Specifically, let us consider: (i) the time it takes employees to travel to and from work (\bar{h}); (ii) the dollar cost to employees of having the job (R), such as the cost of work clothes, child

^{*} Note that differences across employees in the valuation of fringes and cash can be treated in the same way, e.g., the g(h) function can be horizontally or vertically displaced to account for these differences.

Fig. A-1. Optimum Hours and Compensation.





Fig. A-2. Heterogeneous Tastes.



care, and transportation; and (iii) dollar costs to employers (T), such as training costs, social insurance contributions, etc. The effects of these costs are illustrated in figure A-3. The existence of \bar{h} means that the compensation curve lies to the right of g(h) by \bar{h} . The NR costs (T + R) shifts the compensation function down from g(h + \bar{h}) to g(h + \bar{h}) - (T + R). Thus, the time and dollar costs reduce the net output and, hence, the total compensation per employee.

Three important implications of NR costs should be emphasized. First, the downward shift of the g(h) function is essentially an income effect. When leisure is a normal good, this effect leads to an increase in hours worked. In figure A-3, h leads to a movement from A to B and T and R lead to a function shift to C. Second, the costs reduce the worker's average hourly compensation by more for part-time than for full-time workers. Suppose, for instance, that NR costs amount to \$8 per day. This means that net compensation has to fall by \$1 per hour for workers working eight hours, but it must fall by \$2 per hour for workers working only four hours. Thus, the penalty increases as hours worked per week decrease. As is illustrated in figure A-4, the existence of fixed NR costs rules out certain short hours altogether. The net compensation function $g(h + \bar{h}) - (T + R)$ does not yield positive values when hours fall short of h₁. Consequently, part-time jobs for $h < h_1$ would be not available at any positive remuneration, so that the typical employee maximizes his or her utility at c - h = 0.

NR costs that are fixed costs shift the g(h) function down without affecting its slope of g'(h), so that they have only an income

Fig. A-3. The Effects of Nonremunerative Employment Costs





Fig. A-4. Heterogeneous Technologies.



effect. NR costs that vary with h, would, by contrast, make the function flatter, that is, they would reduce g'(h). Consequently, they have both an income and a substitution effect. When leisure is a normal good, the income effect would raise and the substitution effect would reduce the optimal hours worked. The net outcome would be uncertain. Moreover, as long as variable costs do not exceed 100 percent of net output, they do not entirely eliminate low-hour jobs as fixed costs may do. We conclude that, in general, increases in fixed costs are more powerful in raising optimal hours and in eliminating low-hour jobs than are variable costs.

3. Heterogeneous Technologies. Heterogeneous production techniques may also coexist in the theoretical framework presented above. In figure A-4, three different g(h) functions are illustrated: g_1 (h), g_2 (h), and g_3 (h) yield the highest levels of net compensation (c) below h_1 , between h_1 and h_2 and above h_2 , respectively. The relevant aggregate relationship is the envelope of the three functions, which consists of the highest segments of each. The envelope is upward sloping over the relevant range of hours and tends to become flatter at high levels of hours. The effects of fixed costs on the envelope are very similar to those on the individual g(h) functions. A general increase in fixed costs for all technologies shifts the envelope downward and leads to an increase in hours worked, an increase in the penalty for part-time work, and the elimination of some part-time jobs.

When both heterogeneous tastes and technologies are allowed for, individual workers tend to locate along the envelope. Workers with

relatively high (low) preferences for leisure will go to establishments that are most productive at low (high) hours.


THE THEORY OF RETIREMENT

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So far, the discussion has been in terms of tangencies and how they change. The explanation for sudden retirement is not a tangency, but a corner solution. Older workers want to retire gradually, but discover that when they try, they can only do so if they accept a lower wage as a part-time penalty. This part-time penalty reinforces their desire to cut down on hours. And, in fact, it reinforces it to the point where it no longer makes any sense to arrange for a job, and they retire completely.

In figure A-5, the desire to retire gradually is represented by a steepening indifference curve, which "begins to move" the tangency to the left along the production function. At some point, the indifference curves steepen enough so that the most preferred curve the worker can reach, the one that is tangent to the production function, also goes through the origin. Now the worker is indifferent between working and quitting. When the steepening increases slightly, he quits suddenly, that is, he moves to the origin. This is our explanation of sudden retirement.

Fig. A-5. The Retirement Decision.



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Appendix B

EVIDENCE ON THE PART-TIME PENALTY

One implication of our work is that the wage received by an employee will be positively related to his hours worked. This result has been obtained in previous research. For example, Owen (1978) found that men who work part time earned 30 percent less than full-timers and that women experienced a 17 percent differential, controlling for other characteristics. Rosen's (1976) study of joint wage-hour decisions of married women indicated that wages increase by 2 percent with each additional weekly hour worked. The empirical work presented below estimates the relationship between hourly wages and weekly hours, using more recent data.

We employ data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. A cross section was created from the 1979 survey year of the panel. We concentrate on a sample of 3686 married women. Although the data on heads of households is more complete than that for wives, the limited number of part-time workers in the subsample of heads reduces its utility for this line of research.

The objective is to obtain an estimate of the shape of the wage-hours locus. We want to estimate a log-wage regression controlling for weekly hours. This estimation raises several econometric problems that must be addressed, however. First, of the women in the sample, 1660, less than half, were labor-force participants. Since our wage equations were estimated without any correction for this obvious selection

problem, all estimates should be interpreted as conditional on labor force participation.

Second, it is clear that wages and hours are simultaneously determined. If a standard wage regression were estimated, one would expect the coefficient on actual hours to be biased downward. Therefore, separate hour equations are estimated to provide an instrumental variables estimate. This hours instrument is used in place of actual hours in the regressions reported in this section.

A final problem with the estimation of labor force activity of wives results from the joint nature of labor force decisions of couples. The inclusion or exclusion of husband's income in the wives hours or wage equation can significantly alter the empirical results. Larson (1979) notes that the positive coefficient on the hour variables in Rosen's analysis disappears when husband's income is excluded from the wage equation but retained in the hours equation. Preliminary analysis with our data obtained similar results. If marriage results in assortive mating, i.e., able men marry women whose unobserved traits make them more productive--then husband's income may be a good proxy for unobservable ability in the wage equation for wives. Husband's income has a strong negative coefficient in an hours equation. As a result, the hours instrument created from an equation including husband's income will be correlated with the omitted ability proxy if husband's earnings are not included in the wage equation resulting in downward bias on the hours coefficient. The alternative we use in this analysis is to exclude husband's income from both of the equations. Although this provides a less complete model of the labor supply choices of married

women, it gives an unbiased estimate of the wage-hours locus which is our primary concern.

RESULTS

Table B-1 presents the results of regressions of working wives' hourly wages on a vector of personal characteristics. The coefficients generally behave in a predictable way. The major variables are significant and consistent with previous research. Some results are surprising, however. The union coefficient is quite small and is not significant at conventional levels. Additionally, the coefficient on part-time experience, although negative, is small and insignificant. Taken at face value, this would indicate that the returns to a year of part-time experience are equivalent to those from a year of full-time work. Although this result is difficult to accept, speculation about the causes of this result are left for another time.

The main variable of interest in this equation is the hours instrument. The coefficient on hours is statistically significant and large. An increase of more than 3 percent in the hourly wage results from each additional hour in the standard work week. Since the mean number of hours worked by women in the sample is 35, these results imply that, for the typical woman, reducing weekly hours from 35 to 20 would result in a wage that was only 62 percent as large as her previous wage.

The part-time penalty predicted from these estimates is very substantial and is consistent with the theoretical predictions from our model. Further, it should be remembered that fringe benefits are normally reduced for part-time workers, although it is not clear whether

TABLE B-1. LN HOURLY EARNINGS OF WIVES

Variable .	Coefficient	Standard Error
South	~.162*	(.042)
Urban	~.036*	(.018)
White	.102*	(.023)
HSG	.128*	(.024)
sœL	.296*	(.030)
GGRD	.495*	(.031)
Union	.069	(.056)
Age	0006	(.002)
EXPER	.025*	(.004)
exper sq.	0005*	(.0001)
EXPER PT	001	(.001)
Tenur e	.0004	(.004)
* KIDS	.019	(.015)
HRS	.033*	(.014)
Constant	.052	
R ² .33		
n 1660		
lnw 1.55		

South, Urban, White, and Union are (0, 1) variables. HSG, SCOL, and CGFD are also dummy variables representing high school graduates, college attendees, and college graduates. EXPER and Tenure are measured in years, with EXPER PT equaling the number of years that were part time. # KIDS indicates the number of children less than 17 year olds, and HRS is the instrumental variable estimate. The regression from which the hours instrument is derived is shown in table B-2.

^{*} Significant at the 95 percent level.

TABLE B-2. HOURS REGRESSION, WORKING WIVES

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
South	1.598*	(.575)
Urban	.433	(.536)
White	923	(.610)
HSG	264	(.706)
SCOL	.331	(.909)
CGRD	207	(.922)
Union	3.359*	(.791)
Age	.337*	(.140)
Age Sq	0059*	(.0018)
Tenure	.286*	(.054)
KIDS	-1.107*	(.236)
Constant	29.747	

 R²
 .06

 N
 1660

 Hours Mean
 34.6

 Std. Dev.
 11.5

^{*} Significant at the 95 percent level.

these reductions are more or less than proportional to the wage penalty. The empirical findings indicate that the lack of part-time work observed in the economy is consistent with rational labor supply decisions.

The argument for expecting a part-time wage penalty is based on fixed nonremunerative costs and on marginal productivity increasing with hours of work. If this is the case, then we would expect to see differences in the part-time penalty across industries, as a result of different patterns of cost and technology. Table B-3 compares wage regressions for married women in manufacturing and white-collar nonmanufacturing industries. There are differences in the constant and in the magnitudes of some variables, (the race variable, for example), but the equations look quite similar in most respects. The substantial difference, of interest here, however, is in the size of the hours coefficient. It is three times as large in the nonmanufacturing regressions, indicating a much steeper wage-hours locus in this sector. When industry specific dummies were included in this regression, they were significant, but changed none of the coefficients other than the constant.

This finding lends some support to the argument that wages depend on hours due to the structure of costs and technology, although it is obviously not conclusive. The fact that the wage-hours locus is less steep in manufacturing, where a priori, one could expect higher fixed costs, is surprising, but not contrary to the theory. One explanation for this result may have to do with the presence of overtime. Manufacturing industry employees work an average of 38 hours compared to 33 for those in the nonmanufacturing sample, and thus a higher proportion

TABLE B-3. LN HOURLY EARNINGS OF WIVES BY SECTOR

Variable	Manufacturing Coefficient	(SIC 3, 4) Standard Error	Nonmanufacturing Coefficient	(SIC 6,7,8,9) Standard Error
South	207*	(.047)	180	(.059)
Urban	050	(.038)	062	(.027)
White	.038	(.045)	.154	(.039)
HSG	.037	(.044)	.092	(.043)
SCOL	.226*	(.072)	.214	(.066)
CGRD	.470*	(.115)	.436	(.054)
Union	.077	(.052)	.038	(.086)
Age	006*	(.003)	.002	(.003)
EXPER	.031*	(.010)	.023	(.005)
EXPER SQ	0006*	(.0002)	0004	(.0001)
EXPER PT	009	(.006)	001	(.001)
Tenure	001	(.005)	001	(.006)
# KIDS	028	(.016)	.046	(.027)
HRS	.015	(.014	.051	(.025)
Constant	1.025		061	
R^2	. 39		.34	
N	268		1200	
ln v	1.54		1.54	

can be found working overtime. The wage data used in the regressions is based on the standard hourly wage, not average hourly earnings. For employees working less than 40 hours (or not covered by the overtime provisions of the FLSA) the change in average hourly earnings with respect to hours is b_h , the coefficient on hours. For workers receiving overtime the appropriate change is,

$$b_h + (.5H - 40*.5)/H = b_h + (.5 - 20/H)$$
,

due to the presence of an overtime premium for those hours above 40. As an example, using the results from the manufacturing regression, an increase in hours from 35 to 40 would result in an increase in hourly earnings of 7 percent. An increase from 40 to 45, on the other hand, would yield a 13 percent rise in average hourly earnings. Therefore, the manufacturing results will tend to be on the low side if wages adjust in response to regularly scheduled overtime hours.

As a final piece of data on this issue, similar analysis was conducted for males. As noted before, there are very few males working part-time, but there is still substantial variance in hours worked, and the larger sample size allows for separate regressions for 1-digit industries. The coefficients on the hours instrument for the industry-specific wage regressions are displayed in Table B-4. The coefficients are smaller than those from the wives regressions and are generally insignificant. Whether this is due to a flattening of the wage-hours locus as hours increase, the bias imposed by the overtime premium or other reasons is left for future research.

TABLE B-4. HOURS COEFFICIENTS -INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC WAGE REGRESSIONS, MEN

Industry (SIC)	Ħ	(STO DEV)	Н	(t)	R ²
Mining (2)	50.3	13.7	.004	.8	.35
Durables (3)	42.8	6.6	.008	2.5	.23
Nondurables (4)	43.1	6.9	.015	3.5	.25
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities (6)	43.0	9.9	.002	.7	.22
Trade (7)	43.7	10.7	.001	.4	.18
Finance and Insurance (8)	41.7	8.6	006	.8	.32
Services (9)	41.1	12.1	.002	1.0	.26
Government (10)	41.4	8.3	004	.8	.15

Standard models of the labor market posit a single wage independent of the hours chosen. We suggested theoretical reasons to expect that wages will be dependent on hours of work. The empirical analysis presented in this appendix support this conclusion. The results presented are not intended to be a precise analysis of the labor supply. We have special reservations about the results for married women. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the theoretical results in the main text, they imply that the standard models of labor supply and demand require substantially more thought about the shape of the production function and its implications for hours of work observed in the labor market.

Appendix C

AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOURS WORKED AND COMPENSATION

This appendix describes the empirical work on the determinants of part-time work in a sample of 13 manufacturing industries over 20 years. The evidence provides strong support for the basic building block of the theory: that productivity expands with hours up to full time. The empirical work also documents the effect on hours and compensation of determinants, such as age, sex, specific vocational preparation, education, capital intensity, and turnover (which is endogenous in some specifications).

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Long-run competitive equilibrium requires that the value of the entire marginal product per employee accrues to the employee. In figure C-1, g(h) (= c) stands for the employee's marginal product, valued in terms of consumer goods, h for the daily or weekly hours worked and c for the worker's compensation or consumption. c contains all labor costs that constitute remuneration to workers. They do not include nonremunerative labor costs, such as training and supervisory costs and possibly social security and unemployment insurance taxes. Ceteris paribus increases in nonremunerative costs shift the g(h) function downward and thus reduce the typical employee's compensation. The point in the g(h) curve, which maximizes worker utility, is at E, where the highest achievable indifference curve is just tangential to the g(h) function. The next question is: Which factors shift the optimum combination of h and c?




Figure C-l

The point E in figure C-1 may move because of shifts in the g(h) function, or in the indifference map or both. Let us discuss the most likely factors that may shift the two relationships.

- 1. Increases in human capital tend to shift upward the level of compensation because it raises the employee's productivity. If leisure is a normal good then the upward movement of the g(h) function is likely to lead to a rise in c and a reduction in h. Increases in human capital may, however, also affect the indifference map. It is plausible that individuals who acquire much human capital also plan to work relatively long hours.
- Nonremunerative costs, such as costs of training and supervision, tend to lower the g(h) function and thus reduce c and possibly raise h (if leisure is normal). Unfortunately, data on nonremunerative costs are not easily obtained. Hence, in the empirical work, they were approximated by the level of labor turnover. A rise in labor turnover is assumed to raise nonremunerative costs and, hence, to reduce c and possibly to raise h.
- 3. As the age of an employee rises, the g(h) function tends to move down, and this might lead to an increase in hours (if leisure is a normal good). But the indifference map is likely to rotate in a counterclockwise fashion, and this may lead to a decrease in hours. In either case, c is likely to fall.

- 4. The sex of the employee might affect the g(h) function, but it is more likely to shift the indifference map. We might conjecture that, on average, females have a relatively strong preference for "leisure" especially during the child-bearing ages. If this is correct, then females should be observed to have both lower c's and h's than males.
- 5. The degree of unionization may shift the g(h) function.

 Since c is the compensation per employee, measured in consumption goods, an increase in monopolistic power may raise the relevant industry's price relatively to the price of consumption goods and thus raise the g(h) function. This would tend to raise c and to lower h.
- 6. The degree of capital intensity might affect the g(h) function in the short run. It is plausible to suggest that an increase in the capital-labor ratio raises the real marginal product of labor and that, therefore, the g(h) function may rise with capital intensity. In long-run competitive equilibrium, however, relative prices must adjust so that for identical labor and hours c is the same in all industries irrespective of capital intensity. Thus in the short run, an increase in capital intensity may raise c and possibly reduce h.

The theoretical predictions that have been discussed above may now be summarized as follows:

Effect on

Increase in	Compensation (c)	Hours (h)
Human capital	+	?
Labor turnover	-	+?
Age	-	?
Unionization	+	-?
Capital intensity	+	-?

The effects on hours are all queried because there is always a possibility that leisure is an inferior good.

THE DATA

The empirical investigation of the joint determination of compensation and hours is based n data for 13 two-digit manufacturing industries. Twenty years (1961-80) of information is available for each of the 13 industries. Thus, the total number of observations was 260. In order to remove the effects of the business cycles in the time series, dummy variables for each year were introduced. For the same reason, an industry-specific relative output variable was used as an independent variable.

For some of the variables, only pure cross-sectional data are available. Thus, for age, education, sex, degree of unionization, and skill, data were obtained from the 1970 Census. Only one number was used for each industry for the 20 years.

The sources for the other data series are BLS's Employment and

Earnings (for hours, employment labor turnover) and the National Income

and Product Accounts (for compensation of employees, national income).

All time series measured in current dollars were deflated by the relevant industry's wholesale price index.*

THE ESTIMATION

According to the theoretical framework presented above, compensation for employee and hours worked are determined jointly. Hence, there are (at least) two reduced form equations for our model, one for each of the jointly dependent variables. The first step in the estimation consisted of the fitting of reduced form equations to the data by means of ordinary least squares. Table C-1 contains the results of this first experiment. The results can be summarized as follows:

- The degree of capital intensity tends to raise both compensation and hours worked.
- 2. Age reduces compensation and seems to have no effect on hours.

^{*} The deflation could be made using either a price index for the worker's consumption (say, the CPI, or for the firm's output (say, the WPI) for that 2-digit SIC. The reason for this ambiguity is that the model is developed in terms of a single commodity—and this is both consumption good (CPI) and producer good (PI).

More specifically, the relevant variable is c = g. The variable c satisfies the equation $cP_c = wH$, i.e., the worker consumes his pay. Thus, c can be measured $c = wH/P_c$, or compensation deflated by a consumer price index. The variable c also equals g and so can be measured from the equation $gP_c = wH$, i.e., pay exhausts output (the return to capital has been taken out), or $c = g = \frac{wH}{P_c}$, which suggests

deflating by Pg, a producer price index. In practice, we resolved the ambiguity arbitrarily deflating by the PPI.

TABLE C-1. REDUCED FORM EQUATIONS (t-ratios in parentheses)

Independent	Mean of Independent	Donardort 1	Variable Hours ^b
Variables	Variables	Compensation ^a	
Capital Intensity	3.58	.0434 (2.2)	.0293 (2.6)
Age ^d	1.68	8337 (2.5)	.0060 (.03)
Education ^e	11.99	.7595 (3.0)	.1564 (1.1)
Sex ^f	75.57	.0274 (2.4)	.0967 (15.0)
Unionization ^e	47.33	.0032 (.4)	0521 (11.5)
Skill ^h	3.77	.1805 (3.6)	-0.2708 (6.1)
Labor Turnover ⁱ	.022	-7.888 (1.2)	30.7392 (8.6)
Mean of Dependent Variable		8.010	41.90

^aCompensation per employee, in thousands of 1958 dollars (annual). bAverage weekly hours per production worker.

^CNational Income, other than compensation of labor per employee, in thousands of 1958 dollars (annual).

dependent age of employees aged over 65 years.

eAverage years of education.

fPercentage of males.

⁸Percentage of work force unionized.

hSpecific vocational preparation.

Mean of accession and separation rates, monthly as proportion of production workers.

- Education raises compensation, but has only a weak positive effect on hours.
- 4. As the proportion of males rises, both compensation and hours rise.
- 5. The degree of unionization has no impact on compensation, but reduces hours strongly (so that compensation per hour rises).
- 6. Increased skill raises compensation, but reduces hours.
- 7. Labor turnover reduces compensation fairly weakly, but raises hours significantly.

By and large the empirical results in table C-1 bear out the theoretical predictions presented earlier.

One (possibly serious) drawback of the reduced form specification underlying table C-1 is that the level of labor turnover is treated as exogenous. In an alternative specification, labor turnover is treated as an additional jointly endogenous variable, so there are three reduced forms, one each for compensation, hours, and labor turnover. The regression coefficients for the alternative reduced form specification are presented in table C-2. A comparison of the coefficients in table

TABLE C-2. REDUCED FORM EQUATIONS WITH ENDOGENOUS LABOR TURNOVER (t-ratios in parentheses)

Independent ^a	Dependent Variable ⁸							
Variables	Compensation	Hours	Labor turnover					
Capital Intensity	.0377	0069	.007					
	(2.0)	(.6)	(3.9)					
Age	-1.0883	.9862	.0322					
•	(4.1)	(5.8)	(11.9)					
Education	.6510	.5795	.0138					
	(2.8)	(3.8)	(5.7)					
Sex	.0299	.0870	0003					
	(2.6)	(11.9)	(2.7)					
Unionization	0010	0359	.0005					
	(0.1)	(7.6)	(7.0)					
Skill	.3130	3977	0041					
	(4.2)	(8.3)	(5.4)					

 $^{^{\}mathbf{a}}$ For definitions and means of variables, see table C-1.

C-1 with those in table C-2 yields the following conclusions:

- The coefficients for the compensation equations are reasonably close in the sense that they lie within two standard errors of one another.
- 2. In the case of the coefficients of the hours equation, on the other hand, the exclusion of labor turnover, leads to some significant changes. In particular, the coefficient for capital intensity drops from a significant positive to an insignificant negative value; those of age and education rise from low positive to high positive and significant values; the coefficient for sex is not changed by much; those for unionization and skill become less and more negative, respectively.
- 3. Labor turnover is related significantly to each of the other exogenous variables. This is, of course, the reason for the differences in the estimated coefficients for the compensation and hours equation presented in tables C-1 and C-2.

In view of the substantial amount of multicollinearity in the hours equation of table C-1, its coefficients should be treated with caution. This warning is especially applicable to the coefficients of capital intensity and age.

Let us now turn to a discussion of the estimation of the structural equations of the model. Compensation and hours equations were computed

by means of standard two-stage least squares. Since the relationship between compensation and hours is likely to be nonlinear, let us briefly discuss its specification. Johnston (Econmetric methods, 2nd ed. p. 52-53) suggests a logarithmic, reciprocal transformation to obtain a curve that looks like the g(h) function as drawn in the diagrams in previous sections of this report. This function has the form of $\ln \alpha = \alpha - \beta/2$. It has a positive first derivative and an inflection point of h = $\beta/2$. This functional form was used in one specification of the compensation equation. In the second specification, a double logarithmic transformation was applied to compensation and hours. In the hours equation, a double logarithmic transformation was also used.

In the two-stage procedure, a decision has to be made on the number and kinds of exogenous variables that are to be included in the structural equations. In theory, exogenous variables that generate a movement along the c = g(h) function should be excluded from the structural equations while those that shift this function should be included. By this criterion, sex is the most plausible candidate for exclusion. Some experimentation showed, however, that capital intensity and education tended to be highly insignificant, and so they also were excluded as exogenous variables in the structural equations.

Tables C-3 and C-4 contain the results of two sets of estimations. For table C-3, labor turnover was assumed to be exogenous to the system of equations, while for table C-4, labor turnover was treated as a jointly dependent variable. Unfortunately, this difference in specification tends to generate some significant differences in the results.

TABLE C-3. TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION WITH EXOGENOUS LABOR TURNOVER (t-ratios in parentheses)

	Do ln (Compensa	1 (11)	
Right-Hand Variables	(a)	(b)	1n (Hours)
ln (Compensation)			.2862 (4.8)
ln (Hours)		2.1197 (4.0)	
Reciprocal of Hours	-87.2559 (4.0)		
Capital Intensity	(X)	(X)	(X)
Age	2331(X) (10.6)	2333(X) (10.6)	.0634(X) (3.9)
Education	(X)	(X)	(X)
Sex	(X)	(X)	(X)
Unionization	.0019(X) (2.4)	.0192(X) (2.3)	0007(X) (2.9)
Skill	.0640(X) (9.7)	.0641(X) (9.7)	0172(X) (3.7)
Labor Turnover	8651(X) (1.2)	8921(X) (1.2)	.4792(X) (2.3)

Note: (X) means that the variable was used as an instrumental variable.

TABLE C-4. TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION WITH ENDOGENOUS LABOR TURNOVER (t-ratios in parentheses)

	Dej ln (Compensat	s 1n (Hours)	
Right-Hand Variables	(a)	(b)	In (nouts)
ln (Compensation)			.3762 (4.2)
ln (Hours)	2.6477 (4.2)		
Reciprocal of Hours	•	-109.843 (4.2)	
Capital Intensity	(X)	(X)	(X)
Age	3281 (7.8)	3299(X) (7.8)	.1239(X) (3.9)
Education	(X)	(X)	(X)
Sex	(X)	(X)	(X)
Unionization	00004(X) (.04)	00004(X) (.03)	.00001(X)
Skill	.0807(X) (8.5)	.0807 (8.5)	0304(X) (3.8)
Labor Turnover	3.9512 (2.1)	4.0307 (2.1)	-1.4877 (1.9)

Note: (X) means that the variable was used as an instrumental variable.

The empirical findings can be summarized as follows:

An important and apparently robust finding concerns the relationship between compensation and hours. The elasticity of compensation with respect to hours is 2.1 in table C-3 and 2.65 in table C-4. Furthermore, the coefficient of the reciprocal of hours suggests that the nonlinear relationship has an inflection point at 110/2 = 55 or 87/2 = 43.5 hours, below which the first derivative of compensation with respect to hours is increasing. Similar results are obtained from the elasticities of hours with respect to compensation. Their reciprocals are 3.49 (table C-3) and 2.66 (table C-4). Thus, in the case of table C-4, the reciprocal of one elasticity is virtually identical to the value of the other elasticity. In the case of table C-3, the hours equation implies a steeper reaction of compensation to hours than does the compensation equation. Table C-5 contains the ranges of the elasticity of compensation with respect to hours obtained by deducting and adding two standard errors to the point estimates (or their reciprocals) in tables C-3 and C-4.

TABLE C-5. FOUR-STANDARD-ERROR RANGES OF ESTIMATED ELASTICITY OF COMPENSATION WITH RESPECT TO HOURS

	Table C-3	Table C-4			
Compensation Equation	1.06 to 3.18	1.39 to 3.9			
Hours Equation	2.47 to 5.99	1.80 to 5.08			

The combined evidence of tables C-3, C-4, and C-5 suggests strongly that the elasticity of compensation with respect to hours exceeds unity and may well be as large as two. This finding lends support to the proposition put forward in our paper, namely, that there are substantial penalties to working short hours.

- 2. Age tends to reduce compensation, but raise the level of hours. This result is also quite robust. The positive impact on hours is somewhat surprising, but it can be explained by a positive income effect on leisure.
- 3. The influence of unionization is mixed. In table C-3, we have plausible significant coefficients, positive for compensation and negative for hours. But in table C-4, both effects vanish.
- 4. The influence of skill is significant and plausible, positive on compensation and negative on hours. This is a fairly robust result.

5. The effects of labor turnover are mixed and depend crucially on the specification of the model. When labor turnover is assumed to be exogenous (table C-3), the results are plausible. But the coefficients change signs when labor turnover is assumed to be jointly endogenous (table C-4). Such sign changes are unfortunate and must be read as a warning signal. It would appear that labor turnover has not yet been incorporated satisfactorily into our models of the working of the labor market.

The empirical finding of our two-stage-least-squares analysis is that the relationship between compensation and hours seems to be steep and that its first derivative is rising. In spite of some remaining specification problems, this finding appears to be robust. It is also in conformity with our main proposition, namely, that reductions in hours imply substantial losses in compensation.

RESULTS BASED ON A 1970 CROSS SECTION

The analysis carried out on the pooled sample was replicated using a pure industry cross section for the year 1970. Aside from confirming or denying, the 1970 cross section had another purpose to allow a much wider range of industries to be considered—trade and services were added to manufacturing.

As in the pooled data, there are two jointly dependent variables: compensation per employee and weekly hours.

Compensation per employee from the 1970 National Income Accounts includes both wages and salaries and nonwage compensation. Weekly hours are from the 1970 Census of Populations (Census hereafter) industry characteristics.

The right-hand variables included fraction male (Census) skill level*; average age (Census), capital intensity**; a dummy variable indicating direct contact with the public; the fraction self-employed (Census); the fraction of the industry labor force unionized (Freeman); and the average establishment size (Census of Manufactures, Trade, and Mineral Industries). A complete set of variables could be constructed for a sample of 34 industries at roughly the two-digit level of aggregation.

We estimated reduced forms for compensation and hours and two-stage least squares estimates of the production function relating hours and compensation. The reduced form equations are shown in table C-6.

The cross sectional reduced form equations bear a strong resemblance to the reduced form equations based on the pooled data. The signs on age, union, fraction male, skill, and years in school are identical between the cross section and pooled regression. The cross section excludes two variables used in the pooled sample, capital intensity (which was not significant), and turnover (which is not available outside of manufacturing and a few other industries). The cross section

^{*} The fraction of nonprofessional workers will were in trade occupations.

^{**} GNP accounts value added - employee compensation value added

TABLE C-6. REDUCED FORM EQUATIONS PURE CROSS SECTION (t ratios in parentheses)

GONAN INCOMENCE INTOROCOM INCOMENT INSPESSOR DESIGNATE DESIGNATE DESIGNATE INCOMENT INCOMENT

Independent	Dependent Variables					
Variables	In (Compensation)	ln (Hours)				
intercept	2.07	3.64				
•	(.88)	(5.13)				
n (Age)	65	.04				
	(-1.91)	(.40)				
n (Union)	.044	012				
	(1.41)	(-1.3)				
n (Fraction Males)	.51	.15				
	(5.00)	(5.02)				
(Fraction Self-Employed)	08	.016				
•	(-1.86)	(1.26)				
(Skill)	.33	03				
	(3.54)	(-1.11)				
ı (Establishment Size)	.049	.076				
•	(1.18)	(1.26)				
n (Years in School)	•66	.030				
•	(1.07)	(.16)				
2	.87	.77				
dj. R ²	.83	.71				
	34	34				

employed. Large establishments seem to have greater compensation and hours, while self-employment leads to longer hours and lower pay (per hour). The self-employment result seems quite reasonable since self-employment is a means of relaxing statutory requirements for an overtime premium. The size variable represents the effect of teamwork--which raises output and puts a premium on higher hours (part-timers are harder to fit in to a larger team).

We also constructed structural estimates of the production function (the compensation-hours relation) by means of two-stage least squares. The two stage estimates are shown in table C-7.

The cross-section equations should be compared to equation (b) in table C-3 for the pooled data. Cross-section equation (a) is similar in specification, and cross-section equation (b) is slmost identical to pooled equation (b). The elasticities of compensation with respect to hours are similar--1.8 and 2.1 for the cross-section regressions, 2.1 for the pooled data. Thus, the cross-sectional data provide further support for the finding that reductions in hours imply losses in perhour compensation. The effects of unionization, skill, education, and size are all positive, as expected. The effect of age is negative.

TABLE C-7. TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES (CROSS SECTION) (t-Values in parentheses)

Right-Hand Variables	Dependent Varial In (Annual Compensation (a)	
Intercept	-8.01 (-4.05)	(-3.85) (-1.64)
ln (Hours)	1.80 (3.36)	2.10 (4.33)
ln (Union)	.07 (X) (1.95)	.08 (X) (-2.04)
ln (Skill)	.28 (X) (2.55)	.41 (X) (3.98)
In (Education)	1.03 (X) (1.49)	(X)
ln (Size)	.10 (X) (3.24)	.10 (X)
ln (Fraction Male)	(X)	(X)
<pre>1n (Fraction Self-Employed)</pre>	(X)	(X)
ln (Age)	(X)	80 (-2.08)
R ² Adj. R ² N	.76 .72 34	.76 .72 34

Note: (X) means that the variable was used as an instrumental variable.

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Appendix D

POLICY ANALYSIS

In this appendix, we show how the theory we develop in the text is used to estimate the effect of federal policy. We consider three specific policies:


- o A decrease in social insurance costs
- The Social Security earnings' limit
- o A subsidy on hiring older workers.

The same techniques can be applied to other policies as well.

The calculations are based on a mathematical version of figure D-1, which is similar to some of the figures in appendix A. In the mathematical version of the theory, used for the policy analysis, the production function is approximated by the straight (solid) line shown in the figure.

An important determinant of whether an older worker chooses full time work, part-time work, or retires coompletely is the shape of indifference curves like I_0 , which show his trade-off between income and leisure. One reason that I_0 has an upward slope is that the worker has the option of working at other times of his life. In the mathematical model, we represent this option with an explicit life-cycle theory.

Fig. D-1. The Retirement Decision.



The linearized production function is chosen so that total compensation at 40 hours equals \$320. This is approximately equal to median weekly earnings. The slope and intercept parameters are then varied, to allow for different levels of fixed cost (represented by a negative intercept), creating a penalty, in terms of average hourly earnings, for work less than 40 hours. In the tables that follow, the level of the part-time penalty is represented by the ratio of average earnings at 20 hours to average earnings at 40.*

Given this earnings-hours locus, we assume a life-cycle utility model and allow individuals to choose the number of hours worked. We construct a three-period model of the form,

$$U = A_0 L_1^{\alpha} L_2^{\beta} L_3^{\gamma} \gamma^{\delta}, \qquad (D-1)$$

subject to,

$$L_{i} + H_{i} = TA (D-2a)$$

$$Y = \Sigma_{1}(wH_{1} - T)$$
 (D-2b)

where

TA = total time available

w = hourly wage

T = fixed cost

^{*} Due to the linearity of the model, this ratio equals the ratio of fixed costs to total compensation at 40 hours.

L = leisure

H = hours worked

and the model is normalized by

 $\alpha + \beta + \gamma + \delta = 1$.

Additionally, the model is constructed so that period 1 is 3.5 times as long as each of the succeeding periods. Assuming that each of the last periods is equal to 10 years, this model can be viewed as representing three periods: the first from age 21 to 55, the second from 56 to 65, and the third from 66 to 75. The model is designed so that, absent any fixed costs, the typical individual would gradually reduce his hours in each period.

Table D-1 presents simulation results. Parameter values were chosen such that, in the case of no part-time penalty, an individual would work 40 hours per week in the first period, 30 hours in the second period, and 20 in the last. The table displays the optimal hours in each period and the average annual earnings per year (inclusive of retirement years). The results presented assume a fixed requirement of 8 hours of sleep per day, i.e., $TA = 7 \times (24 - 8)$. If TA is set equal to 168 (7×24) , retirement becomes more likely.

Column 1 indicates the effects of different part-time penalties on labor supply over the lifetime. In this model, any part-time penalty over 5 percent will lead to retirement at age 65 rather than reduced

TABLE D-1. HOURS SUPPLIED PER PERIOD AND AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS

l - Part-Time Penalty	Status Quo (1)	Federally Mandated Expenditures Eliminated (2)	Elderly Bonus Program (3)				
1.0	40, 30, 20	39.6, 29.6, 19.5	39.7, 29.7, 19.6				
	14,371	15,815	14,429				
.95	41.2, 31.4, 21.6	40.8, 31.0, 21.1 16,317	40.9, 31.1, 21.2 14,891				
.90	44.7, 35.3,	44.6, 35.3,	42.1, 32.4, 22.6				
	14,779	16,178	15,353				
.85	45.7, 36.5,	45.6, 36.4,	43.1, 33.5, 24.0				
	15,224	16,662	15,815				
.8	46.6, 37.5,	46.5, 37.4,	46.6, 37.5,				
	15,668	17,145	15,668				
.75	47.4, 38.4,	47.4, 38.4,	47.4, 38.4,				
	16.112	17,629	16,112				
.70	48.2, 39.3,	48.1, 39.3,	48.2, 39.3,				
	16,557	18,113	16,557				
.65	54.1,,	53.8,,	54.1,,				
	15,613	17,147	15,613				

TA = 112; $H_1^* = 40$, $H_2^* = 30$, $H_3^* = 20$

hours. A part-time penalty of more than 30 percent will lead to retirement at the end of the first period. As noted before, the ratio of part-time to full-time pay is equivalent to the ratio of fixed cost to total compensation. Referring to table 3, we find that fixed nonremunerative costs are between 10 and 20 percent of total compensation. It is interesting to note that, within this range, we find retirement &t age 65, and quite reasonable values for weekly hours.

It is often argued that federally mandated costs can explain the lack of part-time work for older workers. The findings in column 2 suggest that this isn't the case. In the simulation displayed there, all federally mandated costs were eliminated. While this does significantly increase earnings, it has virtually no effect on the retirement decision. The explanation for this becomes apparent when we return to table 3. Most of the costs that are eliminated are variable rather than fixed.

If it is a policy objective to increase the amount of work by older workers, then policies other than changing social insurance taxes must be employed. Column 3 illustrated a hypothetical program. In this simulation, workers over 65 are paid \$20 per week if they work. As can be seen, over some range of values of the part-time penalty,* this program would induce older workers to remain in the labor force rather than retire. This program affects retirement because it concentrates on fixed rather than variable cost. We don't propose that the government adopt an elderly worker bonus program, but this hypothetical program

^{*} Again, we note that it is this range, .8 to .9, in which the values in table 3 suggest we are.

illustrates the powerful effect of fixed costs on the retirement decision.

An often cited reason for not observing more older workers in the labor force is the earnings test imposed on Social Security recipients. For Social Security recipients, earnings above a certain limit reduce Social Security benefits at a rate of 50 cents for each additional dollar earned. A spike in the earnings distribution, at the earnings limit, is observed empirically for older workers. The following simulations examine the effect of this earnings test on the hours of older workers.

In the previous simulation, it was the case that, for reasonable values of the part-time penalty, retirement occurred before age 65, and therefore, the earnings test is irrelevant. We know that, although most workers retire by age 65, many continue in the labor force. We chose alternative parameter values (specifically, we set desired hours, in the absence of fixed costs, to 30 in the third period) that make retirement less likely. Column 1 in table D-2 shows that workers remain in the labor force until age 75 for most of the range of fixed-cost values.

The effect of an earnings limit of \$6,600 (after which a 50 percent tax is imposed) is illustrated in column 2.* When the part-time penalty is small, older workers remain in the labor force, but work only until they reach the earnings limit. For those values of the part-time penalty that seem most reasonable (15 to 20 percent), the earnings limit results in complete retirement. At higher levels, as in the previous

^{*} We make the rather heroic assumption that employees work an even number of hours each week rather than working the desired number of weekly hours, but reducing weeks worked per year.

TABLE D-2. HOURS SUPPLIED PER PERIOD IN THE PRESENCE OF A SOCIAL SECURITY EARNINGS LIMIT

l - Part-	No Earnings Cap	\$6,600 Earnings Cap	\$10,000 Earnings Cap
Penalty		(2)	(3)
1.0	40, 30, 30	41.9, 32.2, 15.9*	40.8, 30.9, 24.0*
	14,749	14,727	14,959
.95	41.2, 31.4, 31.4	43.2, 33.6, 17.0*	42.1, 32.4, 24.8*
	15,614	15,186	15,417
.90	42.3, 32.7, 32.7	44.3, 34.9, 18.1*	43.3, 33.8, 25.5*
	16,100	15,644	15,876
-85	43.4, 33.8, 33.8	47.2, 38.2,	44.4, 35.0,
	16,586	15,654	16,335
.80	44.3, 34.9, 34.9	48.1, 39.2,	48.1, 39.2,
	17,072	16,113	16,113
.75	48.9, 40.1,	48.9, 40.1,	48.9, 40.1,
	16,572	16,572	16,572
.70	49.6, 41.0,	49.6, 41.0,	49.6, 41.0,
	17,031	17,031	17,031
•65	55.3,,	55.3,,	55.3,,
	16,070	16,070	16,070

^{*} Indicates that earnings equal the earnings limit.

TA = 112; $H_1^* = 40$, $H_2^* = 30$, $H_3^* = 30$

simulations, retirement occurs before the earnings test comes into play. These findings suggest that although Social Security taxes don't appear to be a significant reason for sudden retirement, the imposition of an earnings test on benefits may have a dramatic effect. The earnings test will cause older workers to significantly reduce hours or retire completely when they might have gradually reduced hours while continuing to work.

The impact of an earnings limit depends on the level at which it is set. Column 3 displays the impact of an increase in the limit to \$10,000. As the limit is raised, its impact is lessened. For example, when the part-time penalty is 15 percent, our typical worker remains working rather than retire. One can see that the effect will be greater for higher income individuals or for those with a greater taste for work. As these results indicate, the effect of the earnings limit depends on several factors, but at a set of parameter values that seem to be reasonable, the effect is significant.

From a policy evaluation perspective, the impact of federally mandated expenditures on retirement seem quite small because they are largely variable. We should note, however, that federally mandated costs other than those in table 3, i.e., costs imposed by OSHA, EPA, etc., are not considered. On the other hand, the earnings test for Social Security benefits may have large impact.

The simulation results provided in this appendix are intended as a general guide to the empirical importance of the theoretical findings in our paper. The model is a very simplified construct. It assumes that wages are constant over the lifetime, ignores progressive taxes and

overtime premiums, and doesn't consider the general equilibrium effects of the policies tested. Nonetheless, the results seem reasonable and, in fact, are much more dramatic than we anticipated. These findings indicate that fixed, nonremunerative costs are not only theoretically interesting, but also empirically important as an explanation for sudden retirement.

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Appendix E

THE AGE COMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES

The information in this appendix is drawn from the LEED file, a longitudinal file of Social Security records for a 1 percent sample of all workers covered by Social Security. The tabulations here are based on a sample of about 10,000 records from this file.

Table E-1 gives the industry SIC codes. Table E-2 gives the number of records in each age and industry category. To capture long-term trends, we present tabulations for 1957, the first year of the LEED data, and 1975, the last year.

The item of interest is the numerical importance of older workers in different industries. Table E-3 provides this information in detailed form, showing the age distribution in each industry on a percentage basis. Table E-4 and table E-5 provide it in summary form, recording the fraction of the work force in each industry over 45 and over 60 for the years 1957 and 1975, respectively. To facilitate location of the industries with the most and the fewest older workers, the industries are ordered by the percentage of workers over 45 years.

As can be seen, the work force in the sample was older in 1975 than 1957. In part, this aging is a true reflection of the aging of the population; in part, it is a statistical artifact of the sample. In any event, industry rankings should be unaffected.

Different industries have the greatest concentration of older workers at different times. Table E-6 describes the transitions.

TABLE E-1

INDUSTRY GROUPS ANALYZED

SIC	Abbreviation	Industry					
01	AGRIC	Agriculture Production Crops					
07	AGRSE	Agricultural Services					
09	FISH	Fishing, Hunting, Trapping					
10	METMI	Metal Mining					
11	ANTMI	Anthracite Mining					
12	COAL	Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining					
13	GASEX	Oil and Gas Extraction					
14	nonmet	Mining and Charrying of Nonmetallic Minerals					
15	BCONST	Building Construction					
16	CONSRT	Construction Other Than Building					
17	SPCONS	Special Trade Contractors					
19							
20	FOOD	Food & Kindred Products					
21	TAB	Tobacco Manufactures					
22	TEXT	Textile Mill Products					
23	APPARL	Apparel and Other Finished Products Made From					
		Fabrics and Similar Materials					
24	WOOD	Lumber and Wood Products					
25	FURN	Furniture and Fixtures					
27	PRINT	Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries					
28	CHEM	Chemicals and Allied Products					
29	PETRO	Petroleum Refining and Related Industries					
30	RUBBER	Rubber and Misc. Plastic Products					
31	LEATH	Leather and Leather Products					
32	GLASS	Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products					
33	PRIM	Primary Metal Industries					
34	Fabmet	Fabricated Metal Products					
35	MACH	Machinery (except electrical)					
36	ELMACH	Electrical Machinery and Equipment					
37	TRANEQ	Transportation Equipment					
38	MESUR	Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling					
		Instruments					
41	LTRANS	Local and Suburban Transit					
42	FRTRAN	Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing					
43	POSTAL	U.S. Postal Service					
44	WATER	Water Transportation					
45	AIR	Air Transportation					
46	PIPLIN	Pipelines (except natural gas)					
47	TRANS	Transportation Services					
48	COMM	Communication					
49	ELGAS	Electric Gas and Sanitary Services					
50	DUR	Wholesale TradeDurable Goods					
51	NONDUR	Wholesale TradeNondurable Goods					

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TABLE E-1 (Cont'd)

SIC	C Abbreviation Industry								
52	BLDMAT	Building Materials							
53	GMERCH General Merchandise Stores								
54	FOOD	Food Stores							
55	GASTAT	Gas Service Stations							
56	APSTOR	Apparel and Accessory Stores							
57	FURSTO	Furniture Stores							
58	EAT	Eating and Drinking Places							
59	RETAIL	Misc. Retail							
60	BANK	Banking							
61	CREDIT	Credit Agencies							
62	BROKER	Security and Commodity Brokers							
63	INS	Insurance							
64	INSAGT	Insurance Agents							
65	RESTAT	Real Estate							
66	LOANS	Combinations of Real Estate, Insurance, Loans, Law Offices							
67	HOLD	Holding and Other Investment Offices							
70	HOTEL	Hotels and Rooming Houses							
72	PERSER	Personal Services							
73	BUSER	Business Services							
75	REPAIR	Automotive Repair							
76	MISRE	Misc. Repair Services							
77		•							
78	MOTION	Motion Pictures							
79	AMUSE	Amusement and Recreation							
80	HEALTH	Health Services							
81	LEGAL	Legal Services							
82	EDUC	Educational Services							
83	SOCIAL	Social Services							
84	ART	Museums, Art Galleries							
86	MEMORG	Membership Organizations							
88	PRIHH	Private Households							
89	MISERV	Misc. Services							
90									
97	NATSEC	National Security and International Affairs							
99	NONCLAS	Nonclassifiable Establishments							

TABLE E-2
FREQUENCY OF AGE BY INDUSTRY
1957 AND 1975

						Y	ear 19	57						
SIC		21-25	26-30	11-25	16-49	41-45	46-50	51-55	6-60	61-53	66-70	71-75	76-50	TOTALS
1 7	AGRIC AGRSE	178	j (72 1	67 11	7 G 2	47	41	36)	1 22	7 1	10	0	650 35
9	FISH METMI	Ů.	7	ر د	1)	1 2	"	c 1	.5 .5	Ċ Ç	,	9 1	9	5 15
10 11	ANTHL	0	•	c	1	1	3	r	43	4)	,	•	a	5
12 13	COAL GASEX	7	1 23	2 25	4) 5	/ E	3	; 1	2	3 6	1	U C	0	? ? ? ?
14	Tameon	ં	2	3	4	3	2	2	1	0	2	9	ŏ	25
15 16	BCONST CONSRT	29 17	15 25	47 30	4 \$ 36	61 25	25 15	25 21	15 13	19 e	4	3	9	292 232
17	SPCONS	59	33	72	45	63	43	4.6	12	16	9	6	1	427
.9 20	FOOD	48	1 35	0 17	8 51	G 2E	1 27	0 17	2 15	9 11	0 5	S 0	0 1	14 259
21	TAB	3	C	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	5
22 23	TEXT Apparl	19 43	6 47	23 40	16 35	15 24	17 40	11 23	9 24	5 10	1 5	3	1	130 299
24	WOOD	15	13	15	9 17	10	13	4 7	4	0	3	·O	0	86
2 າ 2 ວ	FURN Paper	10 5	8 7	ę 6	6	ŧ	7	5	4	1	1	9 3	0	74 53
27	PRINT	?7 17	14 17	12 £	14 14	32 32	20 17	17 E	8 7	7 6	4 6	2 1	0	157 123
28 29	PETRO	2	5	2	4	2	1	1	3	1	1	ő	ò	55
30 31	RUBBER LEATH	11 1J	17 5	5 8	6 15	2 10	5 5	4 7	1	5 2	3 2	1	0	61 73
32	GLASS	16	10	14	7	10	10	9	9	7	Z	0	Ŏ	94
33 34	PRIM Fabret	29 29	55 51	15 20	31 20	26 32	17 24	16 16	12	6 14	4 3	3 1	0	184 197
35	MACH	45	21	21	37	25	27	20	11	23	6	2	1	240
36 37	elmach Traneo	4 <i>)</i> 59	33 26	35 43	5 3 55	27 40	25 25	14 16	11 15	11	8	2 2	1	231 262
38	MESUR	7	5	4	8	2	8	7	2	. 6	1	1	Ō	51
39 4 L	MISMAN LTRANS	7	9 1	7 5	5 10	7 12	1 Q 6	6 11	3 3	2 3	1	0. 2	0	57 67
42	FRTRAN	27	23	25	20	33	25	5	5	4	7	1	1	171
43	POSTAL WATER	51 0	:1	12 12	1 4	15	5	5 2	1 5	0	0	0	1 0	16 101
45	AIR	•	5	4	3	ç	4	3	S	1	0	ï	Ó	23
46 47	PIPLIN TRASS	ů 4	•) 3	0 2	.) 0	3	Ş	0 2	0 2	0	0 1	0	0	18
48	COXX	1 e 15	17 12	3 13	11 9	9 18	3 16	10 10	8	2	0	3	0	84
49 50	elgas Dur	66	49	55	57	56	47	32	50	14	19	2 1	1	107 417
51 52	NONDUR BLDMAT	33 15	24 6	17 11	28 11	22 10	8 10	21	6 3	10 0	3. 1	3	0	175 77
53	CERCH	69	55	40	47	35	29	20	50	8	8	3	1	343
54 55	FOOD GASTAT	54 49	37 43	25 41	37 41	28 18	30 18	26 20	15 13	9 · 11 ·	8 7	2 1	0 1	.271 263
56	APSTOR	SO	19	14	17	27	13	16	8	8	5	3	0	149
57 58	FURSTO EAT	7 97	4,	11 73	1 I 91	15 69	17 37	8 45	5 28	1 17	1 12	0 12	0	80 530
59	RETAIL	53	40	27	33	35	53	15	16	8	6	1	Ō	257
60 61	BANK CREDIT	35 25	15 3	1¢ 4	17	` E 5	15 3	e 4	6 3	1	2 1	0.	9	102 46
62	broket Ins	1	11	2	2 11	3 10	3 16	1 10	3 5	0	2	0	0	26
63 64	INSAGT	53 13	.;	5	*\$	3	2	14	3	3	i	i	0	109 42
65 66	RESTAT LOANS	2/	29 0	21 6	2 y	37 0	31 1	32 0	10	16 1	5 0	3	1	251
67	HOLD	7	2	1	7	2	5	2	1	1	1	0	ŏ	· 13
70 72	HOTEL PERSER	26 28	31 34	33 32	24 10	22 25	24 19	19 20	6	12 3	S	2 1	1	195 193
73	BUSER	52	37	35	51	35	33	23	20	•	4	i	ŏ	304
7: 70		11	9 1 ë	12 9	14 5	S S	6	1	3 3	1	0	0	1	59
77	7	1	C	1	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	ŏ	46 2
71 79		1 e 29	4 20	3 10	2 6	£ 24	3 14	4 17	3 6	5	2 1	1	0	41
80	D HEALTH	1 194	6.2	65	55	5 6	30	26	19	13	5	1	0	125 413
81		8 133	9 56	. 72	5 41	3 €1	7 33	3 29	0 19	13	0 12	1	0	35 499
8:	3 SOCIAL	. 16	12	14	11	E	9	7	2	1	2	1	2	83
84		. 46	0 33	e 25	13	5 C	0 24	1 31	2 15	7	0 •	0 3	0	5 221
81	PHIC 8	38	44 15	28	36 11	31 8	10	22	3	14	4	•	0	247
89 90	D	116	70	58	72	Pl	67	36	25	56		0 7	0 1	74 599
9:			5	0 C	9	C 1	0	1	0	•	5	0	0	3
	ALS 2051		-	-	-	i125	957	584	438	529	110	35	11349	3

							Vear	1975						
SIC	IND	-21-25	26-30	11-35	35-44	-1-45	44-50	31-55	jė-£c	£1-65	66-20			
1	ACRIC	3¢	35	32	66	fé	52	67	5 t	30	66-70 19	71-75 8	76-80 1	TOTALS 468
7	AGRSS Fish	· 1	9	e u	7	1	2	Z	1	1	0	0	å	19
10	METMI	C	Ö	C	2	i	ó	0 2	S 0	1	1	0	0	7
11 12	ANTM1 COAL	0 1	0	0 2	0 3	C	1	ō	0	Ō	ö	Ö	0	5 1
13	GASEX	i	Ô	3	3	2 5	3 9	2 6	2 0	3 2	0	2	Ō	zi
14	NONMET	0	0	4	0	4	4	1	ĭ	2	n 3	0	1	35
15 16	BCONST CONSRT	4	4	7	12 17	32 26	32	37	41	30	2	ĭ	ŏ	16 202
17	SPCONS	5	11	13	45	55	28 62	37 45	25 44	16 31	11	1	0	166
19 20	£00D	0 6	0 6	C 4	1	1	1	1	2	1	Ö	6	0	324 7
21	TAB	ŏ	č	ċ	27 1	56	30 0	26 0	50	17	6	0	0	168
42	TEXT	S	4	7	13	14	7	13	15	7	3	0 3	0	3
23 24	MOOD	6 3	6	16 3	27 4	22 15	39	43	25	9	11	4	ő	8 e 21 c
25	FURN	4	ì	6	6	15	13 10	ع 10	7 5	5	1 1	0	0	63
26 27	PAPER PRINT	0 3	9 G	4	3	8	9	5	6	5	í	0	0	\$5 45
23	CHEM	i	ŏ	6 1	17 3	13 · e	12 15	19	11	13	5	2	ő	101
29	PETRO	Ō	0	0	ŏ	ž	ĨÓ	í	· 8	6 2	3	1	0	5 5
30 31	Rubber Leath	0	1	6 1	11	7	9	4	4	1	3	ŏ	0	8 51
32	CLASS	Ä	5	ē	5	5	8 15	12	11 5	0	2	0	2	50
33 34	PRIM Fabreti	3	0	Z	7	23	12	19	ý	7	4	0	0	87
35	MACH	4	3	6 2	14 29	1,9 28	21 19	21 37	15	14	3	2	ō	129
36	EL.YACE	3	6	4	23	10	28	26	24 27	19 14	0	2 1	D	167
37 38	TRANEQ MESUR	9	3 1	1	24	15	28	21	17	14	1	i	0	154 128
39	MISMAN	ì	i	ž	2 5	6 12	6 3	4 5	7 5	4 5	2	.0	0	36
41 42	LTRANS FRTRAN	1	5	4	7	10	3	5	6	5	1 7	0 1	1	41 54
44	WATER	1	1	12	22 3	41 5	25 4	55	19	15	2	1	ž	162
45	AIR	0	0	ò	í	3	3	4 3	1	4	0	0	0	41
46 47	Piplin Trans	0 2	0	1	0	C	0	Ö	Ō	i	ó	1	0	14 2
48	COMM	3	i	9	2 5	3 9	2 10	1 3	2	1	0	0	ŏ	13
49	ELGAS	0	1	3	ŕ	á	4	5	1 2	3 5	4	0	0	4.6
50 51	DUR NONDUR	2 2	16 7	14 .4	38	53	44	50	49	34	6	3	2	35 311
52	BLDMAT	ì	3	•	6 7	15 14	14 5	3	9	4	0	1	0	65
53 54	GYERCH FOOD	12 7	•	to	28	25	25	17	35	18	1 11	1	0	47 196
55	GASTAT	5	7	5 5	32 21	28 34	25 32	28 28	26	15	4	4	ž	183
35	APSTOR	3	5	5	9	ě	8	55	21 26	15 11	8 10	3 6	0	181
57 58	FURSTO EAT	10	0 35	1 30	1 62	9 76	6	4	7	4	2	ŏ	2	115 35
59	RETAIL	4	1	6	ŞŠ	17	58 18	56 21	60 27	31 19	12 3	5	S	439
60 61	BANK CREDIT	5	2 0	0	12	8	55	7	7	Ť.	5	0	0	139 74
3.1	BROKER	ò	0	C O	2 2	3	3 2	2	3	•	1	2	ň	17
• 3	INS	1	7	2	19	15	5	Ę	1 16	0 5	1 1	0 1	0	9
:- t	insagt Restat	5	1 3	6	2 19	13	.1	.5	1	3	1	ō	0	84 30
62	LOANS	ō	č	č	2	25 0	16 0	13	15 0	8	7	4	0	1 36
6? 70	Hotel Hotel	0 8	0 11	.0	1	4	1	1	2	ŏ	ŏ	0	0	2
72	PERSER	4	4	13 10	20 12	3 <i>2</i> 23	35 25	22 20	28 14	12	6	3	Ĭ.	194
73	BUSER	13	13	27	26	46	49	41	30	15 27	4 5	3	0	134 282
75	REPAIR	2	3	1	6	8	5	3	3	0	S	ò	ô	33
_														
76 78	MISRE	1	S .	C	1 5	4 E	9	3	S	4	1	0	0	\$5
79	AMUSE	7	3	Z	17	18	14	6 12	1 3	Z E	5	0	0	34
80	HEALTH	6	16	30	61	69	47	56	43	15	15	3	2	88 363
81 82	LEGAL EDUC	0 11	0 19	2 26	5 54	5 72	2 64	7 47	1 35	2 32	0 16	0	0	3.6
33	SOCIAL	2	4	4	3	E	7	7,	5	32	10	2	0	378 45
86 88	MENORG PRIHE	6	4	3	13 11	33 36	11	14	19	10	4	2	3	122
89	HISERY	3	3	i	5	10	19 3	24 6	50 12	17	6 2	3	1	168
90 97	KATSEC	16	10	12	39	5C	39	51	35	31	8	0	3	49 294
99	HONCLAS	0 1	0	0	0 S	C 1	0	0 1	0	•	0	0	0	2
TETAL		328	406	1005	1214	1161	1130	1913	680	242	88	32	n 7637	3

TABLE E-3
AGE DISTRIBUTION BY INDUSTRY: 1957 AND 1975

Year 1957

				21-75	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66-7a	71-75		
510 1	AGRIC	21-25 21	26-30 14	31-35 11	10	10	70-70	6	5	3	1	1	76-80	TOTALS 100
7	ACRS&	ĭi	22	2	31	8	5	11	0	2	\$	0	0	100 100
9	FISH	0	40 25	40 0	0 6	20 13	0 13	0 6	8 0	Ö	ö	6	6	100
10 11	METMI ANTML	20 0	20	Č	Ŏ	20	60	Ō	0	0	٥	0	D	100
12	COAL	25	3	7	0	25	10	10	7 5	10 D	D 1	0	0	100 100
13	CASEX	9	27 8	34 12	6 16	8 12	8	1	4	ŏ	ó	6	ŏ	100
14 15	NONMET BOONST	32 9	5	16	14	20	ē	9	5	6	ì	1	0	100
16	CONSRI	é	12	14	17	14	8	10	6	3 3	1	0	9	100 100
17	SPCONS	13	7	16 0	15 57	14	10	11	<i>2</i> 0	9	2	1	ŏ	100
19 20	£000	28 18	23	6	19	10	10	6	6	4	5	Ö	0	100
21	TAB	37	0	25	32	12	. 0	0	0	0	15	0	0	100
22	TEXT	14	4	17	12 11	14 e	14. 13	8 7	6 8	3 3	b	B O	0 2	100 100
23 24	APPARL WOOD	14	15 15	13 17	10	11	15	į	4	Ö	3	D	0	100
25	FURN	13	10	10	22	12	13	9	4 7	2 1	0	0 5	0	100
26	PAPER	,	13	11 7	11 8	15 20	13 12	5 10	5	•	Ş	i	ŏ	100
27 23	PRINT CHEM	17 13	15	6	11	16	13	6	5	4	4	0	C	100
29	PETRO	9	22	9	18	9	4	4	13	4	•	0	0	100
30	RUB322	10	27	14	9 20	3 13	3 8	6 9	1 10	8 2	2	1 6	8	100 100
31 32	LEATH GLASS	13	6 10	10 14	7	10	10	ý	-,	ž	š	Ď	Q	100
33	PRIM	16	11	•	16	14	9	e	6	3	Š	1	0	100
34	Fabrat	14	11	15	10	16	12 11	8	3	7	5 1	0	0	100 100
35	MACH ELMACH	19 21	14	15	15 9	10 11	10	6	- 1	í	ž	ŏ	ŏ	100
36 37	TRANEQ	17	••	16	10	15	9	6	5	4	1	0	0	100
38	MESUR	13	9	. 7	15	3	15	13	3 5	11	1	1	0	100 100
39	KAKZIK	12	15 11	12	8 14	12 17	17	10 16	4	į	î	Ş	ŏ	100
41 42	LTRANS FRIRAN	8 15	13	14	ii	16	14	2	2	2	4	0	D	100
43	POSTAL	ō	25	12	6	10	12	12	6	0	0	0	6	100 100
44	WATER	SO	10	11 17	3 13	16	6 17	21 13	4 8	0	0	ĭ	ő	100
45 46	air Piplin	0	21 0		ő	75	25	Ö	Ō	Đ	0	.0	0	100
47	TRANS	22	16	11	D	11	11	11	11	0	5	0 3	0	100
48	CC:C1	Sī	20	3	13 8	10 16	3 14	11	9 3	2 5	0	1	0	100 100
49 50	ELGAS DUR	14 15	11 11	12 13	13	13	ii	į	Ĭ	3	Ă	ō	ŏ	100
51	NONDUR	ii	13	9	16	12	4	12	3	5	1	1	0	100
52	BLDMAT	19	7	14	14	12 10	12	11	3 5	9 2	1	0	1	100 100
53	CERCE	20 19	16 13	11	13 13	10	11	÷	5	3	ž	Ď	ŏ	100
54 55	FOOD GASTAT	18	16	15	15	6	6	7	4	4	Š	0	•	100
56	APSTOR	13	12	9	11	18	6	10 10	5	5 1	3 1	5	0	100 100
57	FURSIO	8 18	5	13 23	23 27	18 13	21 6	•	5	3	ż	Š	ŏ	100
58 59	eat Retail	50	15	10	12	13	8	5	6	3	Ş	0	0	100
60	BANK	21	14	,	11	.7	14	7	5	3	į	5	0	100 100
61 62	BROKER	17	43 34	8 7	19	10 11	6 11	3	11	ő	ì	Ď	ŏ	100
63	I/S	3 30	21	Ä	10	-,	14	•	4	Z	0	0	0	100
64	Insact	30	•	7	11	11	4	,	7	7	Ş	Š	0	100
6'	RESTAT	10	11	12 46	11 0	14 C	12 7	12	3 7	6	1 D	1	0	100 100
66 67	LOANS BOLD	30 24	6	3	24	ě	17	6	3	3	3	Ð	0	100
70	HOTEL	13	15	11	12	11	12	•	4	6	į	1	0 D	100
72	PERSER	14	17	16 11	16	12 12	10	10	3 6	1 2	1	0	8	100
73	DUSER	17	12	**	,,,	~~	••	•	-	_	_	-		
						_			_			_	•	100
73	REPAIR		27	20 17	23 10	3 6	10 13	6 2	5 6	1	0	2	1	100
76 77	HISRE	23 50	13	50	70	ö	ij	0	0	0	0	0.	D	100
78	MOTION	17	•	7	4	14	7		7	12	•	2	0	100
79	AMUSE	16	16		4	19 6	11	13 6	•	4	0	0	0	100 100
80	HEALTH LEGAL	26 22	15 25	15	8 3 B		20	ě	ò	2	0	5	0	100
81 8 2	EDUC	26	17	14		12	6	5	3	2	S	P	0	100
83	SOCIAL	16	14	16	13	2	10	50 6	2 40	40	5	1	5	100 100
84	ART	0	14		• 5	•	10	14	7	3	Ğ	1		100
86 88	MEMORG Prinn	20 15	17	11	14	12	7	8	3	5	1	Ĭ	0	100
89	HISERY	14	20	5	14	10	13	6	9	1	S S	0	0	100 100
90		17	11 66	14	12	13	11	6 33	•		ò	ě	Ö	100
97	XATSEC WONCLAS				Ď	33	ŏ	Õ	0	•	66	•	0	109
701			93 1	l Si	2 12	2 1	0	•	5	3	2	D	D 70	D.

							Year	r 1975						
SIC	IND	21-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66-70	71-75	76-80	IDTALS
7	agric Agrse	· 6		6	13 36	14 21	12 15	14 10	10 5	6 5	4	1	0	100 100
9	FISH	0	Ò	0	0	14	28	28	0	14	14	D	Ď	100
10	METMI ASTMI	0	. 0	0	40 0	50	100	0	40 . 0	0	₽ D	0	0	100 100
12	COAL	4	4	9	14	9	14	9	9	14	D	9	Ō	100
13 14	GASEX	2 0	0	25	22 0	14 25	25 25	17 6	0 6	5 12	9	9	2 0	100 100
15	BCONST	ì	ĭ	3	5	15	15	10	20	14	Ō	ŏ	ŏ	100
16	CONSRI	1	2 3	•	10 14	15 16	16 19	22	15 . 13	10 9	0 3	0	0	100
17 19	SPCONS	1	0	6	ii	14	11	13 14	28	14	Ď	•	9	100 100
20	FOOD	3	3	2	16	15	17	15	11	10	3	0	0	100
21 22	TAB TEXT	0 2	0	0 7	33 14	0 15	7	0 14	0 17	33 7	33 3	0 3	0	100 100
23	APPARL	2	2	7	13	10	10	20	11 .	. 4	5	1	•	100
24 25	WOOD FURN	4 7	6 1	4 10	6 10	23 14	20 18	12 18	11	7	1	0	0	100 100
26	PAPER	0	0	8	6	17	20	20	13	. 11	2	D	Ď	100
27	PRINT	2	0	5 1	16 5	12 14	11 27	18 16	10 14	12 10	4 5	1	0	100 100
23 29	CHEM PETRO	i	0	Ō	D	25	0	12	37	25	0	ō	ŏ	100
30	RUBBER	0	7 · 2	11	21 14	17 14	17 16	7 24	7 22	1	5 2	0	0	100
31 32	LEATH CLASS	0 2	11	2	11	11	34		11	9	Ď	0	ò	100 100
33	PRIM	3	D	2	8	26	13	21	10	8	4	0	1	100
34 35	Pabmet Mach	4 2	6 1	1	10 17	14 16	16 .11	16 22	11 14	10 11	2 D	1	0	100 100
36	ELMACE	ī	3	2	14	11	18	16	17	9	2	•	Ď	100
37	TRANEQ	0 5	2	0	18 5	11 16	5 5	16 11	13 19	10 11	0 5	3	Ð	100
38 39	MESUR -	2	ž	4	ıž	29	7	12	12	12	ž	ŏ	5	100 100
41	LTRANS	1	?	7	12 13	18 25	5	9 13	11	9	12	1	0	100
42 44	FRTRAN VATER	0 2	0 2	7 34	7	25 21	15	13	11 2	9	1	0	1 D	100 100
45	AIR	D	0	0	7	21	21	21	7	7	7	7	Ď	100
46 47	PIPLIN TRAYS	0 15	0	50 D	0 15	0 23	15	9	0 15	50 7	0	. 0 .0	0	100 100
48	COMM	16	2	10	10	18	20	6	2	6	8	.0	ŏ	100
49 50	ELGAS DUR	0	2 5	e	20 12	22 17	11 14	14 16	5 15	14	D	0	0	100
51	NONDUR	3	10	6	9	23	21	.4	13	-6	õ	0 1	Ö	100 100
52	BLOMAT	2	6	0	14 14	29 14	10	17	6 17	. B 9	S	S	•	100
53 54	CMERCH FOOD	6 3	4 3	5 2	17	15	12 13	15	14	6	5 2	0 2	0	100 100
55	GASTAT	2	4	2	3 L	18	17	15	11	В	4	1	Ď	100
56 57	APSTOR FURSTO	2 2	4	4 2	. 7 . 2	6 25	6 17	19 11	20 22	9 11	8 5	5 0	1 O	100 100
58	TAS	2	7	6	14	17	13	12	13	7	2	1	Ö	100
59 60	RETAIL BANK	2 8	0 2	4	16 16	12 10	12 29	15 9	19 9	13 10	5	0 1	0	100 100
61	CREDIT	5	Õ	ŏ	11	17	17	e i	17	- 5	5	11	ŏ	100
62	REXCRE		0 B	0	22 22	22 22	22 5	11 9	11 19	0 5	11	Ō	0	100
63 64	INS INSAGT	1	3	3	6	43	3	16	3	10	3	1 0	0	100 100
65	RESTAT		2	4	13	21	11	9	11	16	5	2	D	100
65 67	enkoj Eukaj	0	0	0	100 11	44	0 11	0 11	22 0	0	0	0	0	100 100
70	HOTEL	Ä	5	6	10	16	18	11	14	6	3	1	ž	100
72	PERSER	2	2	7	8	17 16	1 8 17	14 14	10 10	11	2 1	2 1	0	100 100
73 75	Buser Repair		÷	ź	18	24	15	9	9	ó	Ė	Ď	ŏ	100
75	HISRE	4	•	D	4	16	36	12	8	16	4	0	0	100
78	HOTION	27	5	Ō	14	17	17	17	2	5	0	0	0	100
79 80	AMUSE HEALTH	7	3 4	2 8	21 16	20 19	12 15	13 15	3 11	9	2	0	0	100 100
81	LEGAL	ō	•	7	17	32	7	25	3	7	•	0	0	100
82	EDUC	2	5	6	14	19	16	12	9	8	4	Ö	Ö	100
83 86	SOCIAL		3	8 2	6 10	13 27	15 9	20 11	11 15	8	3	D 1	0 2	100 100
88	Pri H4	0	2	2	6	15	11	14	29	11	3	1	0	100
89 90	MISERY	6 5	6	2	10 13	20 17	6 13	12 17	24 11	10	8	8	2 1	100 100
97	KATSEC		i	7	109		0	0	0	0	0	ö	ô	190
99	KONCLA		•	0	0	33	0	33	0	0	D	0	Ō	100

TABLE E-4

INDUSTRIES WITH HIGHEST PERCENTAGE
OF WORKERS OVER 45 (1957)

SIC	Industry	Percent over 45	Percent over 60	No. in sample
57	Furniture, home furnishing, and equipment stores	57	8	80
78	Motion pictures	55	25	41
27	Printing, publishing, and allied industries	54	12	157
41	Local suburban transit and interurbanishmay passenger transportation	an 52	11	67
56	Apparel and accessory stores	51	15	149
26	Paper and allied products	51	14	53
	Amusement and recreation services, except motion pictures	51	8	125
15	Building construction	50	13	292
65	Real estate	49	11	251
44	Water transportation	49	4	107
49	Electric gas and sanitary services	48	9	107
39	Misc. manufacturing industries	48	9	57
28	Chemicals and allied products	48	13	123
86	Membership organization	48	15	221
38	Measuring, analyzing, and controlling insutruments	47	16	51
34	Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equip.	47	11	197
32	Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products	47	18	94
22	Textile mill products	45	9	130
31	Leather and leather products	44	14	73

TABLE E-4 (Cont'd)

70	Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other lodging places	44	12	195
33	Primary metal industries	43	12	184
17	Construction, special trade contractors	43	8	427
64	Insurance agents, brokers, and service	42	18	42
23	Apparel and other finished products made from fabric and similar material	42	14	299
16	Construction other than building	42	10	262
50	Wholesale trade, durable goods	42	11	417
89	Miscellaneous services	41	12	74
42	Motor freight transportation and warehousing	40	8	171
25	Furniture and fixtures	40	6	74
54	Food stores	40	10	271
52	Building materials, hardware, garden supplies, mobile home dealers			
37	Transportation equipment	48	10	262
81	Legal services	40	4	35
90		40	10	599
51	Wholesale trade, nondurable goods	39	11	175
58	Eating and drinking places	39	12	530
20	Food and kindred products	38	12	259
63	Insurance	38	6	109
73	Business services	38	9	304
48	Communication	38	14	84
60	Banking	37	8	102

TABLE E-4 (Cont'd)

24	Lumber and wood products except furniture	37	7	86
88	Private households	37	10	247
59	Miscellaneous retail	37	11	257
61	Credit agencies other than banks	36	12	46
72	Personal services	36	5	193
83	Social services	35	8	83
36	Electrical and electrical machinergy, equipment supplies	35	8	231
53	General merchandise stores	35	9	343
1	Agriculture production crops	33	10	650
76	Miscellaneous repair services	31	10	46
82	Educational services	30	7	499
55	Automotive dealers and gas service stations	29	10	263
7	Agricultural services	28	4	35
80	Health services	27	8	413
30	Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products	26	14	61
75	Automotive repair, services and garages	26	7	59
13	Oil and gas extraction	19	6	72

TABLE E-5

INDUSTRIES WITH HIGHEST PERCENTAGE
OF WORKERS OVER 45 (1975)

SIC	Industry	Percent over 45	Percent over 60	No. in sample
57	Furniture, home furnishings and equipment stores	89	36	350
28	Chemicals and allied products	87	30	55
38	Measuring, analyzing, and controllinstruments, photographs, medical and optical goods, watches, and clocks	ing 84	35	36
88	Private households	84	44	168
26	Paper and allied products	83	26	45
33	Primary metal industries	83	23	87
15	Building construction	82	34	202
31	Leather and leather products	82	28	50
64	Insurance agents, brokers and service	78	16	30
86	Membership organizations	76	29	122
39	Miscellaneous manufacturing industries	76	28	41
56	Apparel and accessory stores	76	45	115
35	Machinery, except electrical	75	26	167
42	Motor freight transportation and warehousing	75	22	162
65	Real estate	75	34	136
37	Transportation equipment	74	26	128
32	Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products	74	20	44

TABLE E-5 (Cont'd)

52	Building materials, hardware, garden supplies, and mobile home dealers	74	18	47
24	Lumber and wood products, except furniture	74	19	63
89	Miscellaneous services	74	36	49
72	Personal services	74	25	134
55	Automotive dealers, gas service stations	74	24	181
36	Electrical and electronic machinery, equipment, supplies	73	28	154
17	Construction, special trade contractors	73	25	324
50	Wholesale trade, durable goods	73	26	311
59	Miscellaneous retail	73	34	139
70	Hotels, rooming houses, camps and other lodging places	71	26	194
90				
20	Food and kindred products	71	24	168
60	Banking	70	22	74
34	Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment	70	24	129
54	Food stores	70	27	183
_		, 0	2,	103
23	Apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar materials	69	21	210
83	Social services	69	21	45
82	Educational services	68	21	378
51	Wholesale trade nondurable goods	68	20	65

PARAMETERS OF THE PROPERTY OF

TABLE E-5 (Cont'd)

27	Printing, publishing, and allied			
	industries	68	27	101
73	Business services	68	21	282
25	Furniture and fixtures	67	17	55
22	Textile mill products	66	30	88
49	Electric gas and sanitary services	66	19	35
80	Health services	65	19	363
58	Eating and drinking places	65	23	439
41	Local and suburban transit and interurban highway passenger			
	transportation	65	33	54
53	General merchandise stores	65	31	196
13	Oil and gas extractuion	63	7	35
75	Automotive repair services and garages	63	15	33
	aim garages	-	13	33
63	Insurance	62	26	84
79	Amusement and recreation services, except motion pictures	62	14	88
1	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	61	21	468
48	Communication	60	16	48
78	Motion pictures	58	7	34
30	Rubber and miscellaneous plastics	-,		
	products	54	13	51
44	Water transportation	50	11	41

TABLE E-6

INDUSTRY TRANSITION

Older Industries in 1957 and 1975

Furniture Stores
Paper Products
Building Construction
Real Estate
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Chemicals
Membership Organizations
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products

Median Industries 1957/Older Industries 1975

Leather Products
Machinery
Miscellaneous Services
Motor Freight Transport
Transportation Equipment

Median Industries 1957 and 1975

Hotels and Rooming Houses Special Trade Construction Wholesale Trade (Durable) Furniture and Fixtures Food Stores Wholesale Trade (Nondurable)

Median Industries 1957/Younger Industries 1975

Eating and Drinking Places

Younger Industries 1957 and 1975

Insurance
Communication
General Merchandise Stores
Health Services
Rubber and Plastic Products
Automotive Repair
Oil and Gas Extraction

TABLE E-6 (Cont'd)

Younger Industries 1957/Older Industries 1975

Lumber and Wood Products Private Households Personal Services Gas Service Stations

Older Industries 1957/Median Industries 1975

Printing, Publishing Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services Fabricated Metal Textile Mill Products

Older Industries 1957/Younger Industries 975

Motion Pictures Local Transport Amusement and Recreation Water Transportation

Younger Industries 1957/Median Industries 1975

Food and Kindred Products
Business Services
Banking
Miscellaneous Retail
Social Services
Electrical Machinery
Educational Services

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